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The Equal Protection Clause and Imprisonment of the
Indigent For Nonpayment of Fines
The practice of imprisonment for failure to pay a fine levied
for a criminal violation originated in twelfth-century England; 1 its
subsequent unanimous acceptance in the United States is manifested

I. SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 275 (6th ed. 1960). For an extensive dis•
cussion of the historical development of the use of fines, see 2 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAw 43-44, 46 (3d ed. 1923); I STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 57 (1883).
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in the provisions in the statutes of every state2 and of the federal
government3 authorizing imprisonment for nonpayment of fines.
A few states not only commit the defendant to jail for nonpayment
of the fine, but impose hard labor as well. 4 Some states, however,
have mitigated to a degree the harshness of the practice. For example, Arizona restricts the total period of confinement for the crime
and the default of the fine to the maximum sentence authorized for
the substantive offense.5 In addition, the majority of states have
statutes which ameliorate the burden upon the indigent6 by providing for the discharge of "poor" prisoners after some minimum period
of incarceration. 7
The greatly increased use of fines in the twentieth century has
made imprisonment for nonpayment a prominent sanction in the
administration of our criminal laws. 8 American- courts have traditionally taken the position that such imprisonment is not a form
of punishment for the substantive crime, but is instead a method
of compulsion to secure payment of the fine. 9 At the turn of the
century, some courts held that statutes authorizing imprisonment
for nonpayment of fines were valid if a fine was the sole sanction
imposed for the crime, but invalid when the sentence for the crime
2. E.g., Au.sKA STAT. § 12.55.010 (1962): "A judgment that the defendant pay a fine
shall also direct that he be imprisoned until the fine is satisfied, specifying the extent
of the imprisonment, which cannot exceed one day for every $5 of the fine." The
variations among the state statutes are usually in the dollar amount to be credited
against the fine for each day of confinement. See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2315 (1964);
CAL. PEN. CODE § 1205; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.14 (Supp. 1964); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:529.3 (1951); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 718.
3. 18 u.s.c. § 3565 (1964).
4. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 341 (1958); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-7 (1953).
5. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1648 (1956).
6. An indigent has been defined as one who is needy and poor, or one who has not
sufficient property to furnish a living, or anyone who is able to support him, or to
whom he is entitled to look for support. See BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
7. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.030 (1962); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-9 (1964);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 180-6 (Smith-Hurd 1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 551.010 (1953).
There is also a corresponding federal statute. Indigent Prisoner's Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3569
(1964).
8. The increased use of fines is attributed to the increased number of "minor"
offenses. RUBIN, CRIMINAL CORRECTION 230 (1963). Although there is a lack of statistical
data, it has been estimated that fines constitute 75% of all sentences imposed in the
United States. Id. at 240; SUTHERLAND & CRESSEY, op. dt. supra note 1, at 276. Periodic
studies of Philadelphia's Reed Street Prison and the Baltimore City Jail between 1940
and 1950 indicated that approximately 60% of all persons imprisoned in those institutions had been committed for nonpayment of fines. Ibid.; Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv.
1013-14 (1953). The full magnitude of the problem is best illustrated by the fact that
New York City, in 1960 alone, collected a record total of nearly $15 million in fines, and
committed over 26,000 people for nonpayment. N.Y.C. MAGISTRATES' CoURTS ANN. REP.
table 7 at 24-25, table 15 at 31 (1960).
9. See Ex parte Vendetti, 6 Alaska 381 (4th Div. 1921); In re Sullivan, 3 Cal. App.
193, 84 Pac. 781 (Ct. App. 1906); Mullin v. State, 38 Del. 533, 194 Atl. 578 (Super. Ct.
1937); McKinney v. Hamilton, 282 N.Y. 393, 26 N.E.2d 949 (1940); Foertscp. v. Jameson,
48 S.D. 328,204 N.W. 175 (1925).
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included both fine and imprisonment.10 However, later authority
in other states indicates that this position was merely an isolated
exception to the general judicial acceptance of such statutes.11 The
courts have consistently upheld the constitutionality of statutes
authorizing imprisonment for nonpayment in the face of assertions
that the procedure constituted a cruel and unusual punishment12 or
amounted to imprisonment for debt.13
The deprivation of freedom resulting from the application of
these statutes has been most immediate and severe for the indigent
defendant whose poverty precludes payment of any fine imposed
upon him. This factor brings into focus the essential question
whether the indigent is denied the equal protection of the laws
when he is, in effect, automatically incarcerated for nonpayment of
his fine, whereas the person of means can purchase his immediate
release. Although this issue has not yet been presented to the United
States Supreme Court, it has arisen in lower courts14 because of
the Supreme Court's increasing reliance upon the equal protection
clause to mitigate the plight of the indigent defendant.16
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has adhered to two basic views
as to· what amounts to a denial of equal protection. The first formed
the basis for the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 16 in which
the Court held that segregation of white and Negro children in
public schools, pursuant to state statutes which permitted or required
such segregation, denied the Negroes the equal protection guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The statutes were condemned
not because they were unfairly administered, but because they were
discriminatory on their face. 17
The second view was formulated by the Court in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 18 in which a Chinese laundryman had been denied a license
10. People v. Brown, 113 Cal. 35, 45 Pac. 181 (1896); People v. Kerr, 15 Cal. App.
273, 114 Pac. 584 {Ct. App. 1911); Reese v. Olsen, 44 Utah 318, 109 Pac. 941 (1914):
Roberts v. Howells, 22 Utah 389, 62 Pac. 892 (1900). This position was justified on the
ground that the imposition of imprisonment, in addition to a punitive jail sentence
for a definite term, exceeded the court's power.
11. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 189 A.2d 132 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Lee v.
State, 103 Ga. App. 161, 118 S.E.2d 599 (1961); People ex rel. Crockett v. Redman, 41
Misc. 2d 962,246 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
12. See, e.g., Foertsch v. Jameson, 48 S.D. 328, 204 N.W. 175 (1925).
13. See, e.g., State v. Kilmer, 31 N.D. 442, 153 N.W. 1089 (1915); Ex parte Small, 92
Okla. Crim. 101, 221 P.2d 669 (Crim. Ct. App. 1950); Harlow v. Clow, 110 Ore, 257,
223 Pac. 541 (1924).
14. United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. US {S.D.N.Y. 1965); People
v. Collins, 47 Misc. 2d 210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 {Orange County Ct. 1965). See generally
notes 31-50 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 21-26 infra and accompanying text.
16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
17. See also, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
18. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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to operate, although licenses were being granted to non-orientals:
In holding this to be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection,
the Court stated that even though the statute was fair on its face,
the Constitution is violated when the law is "applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand" 19
so as to discriminate unjustly between persons in similar circumstances.20
In 1956 the Court established a new equal protection standard
in Griffin v. Illinois. 21 Although_ the scope of this 4-1-4 decision22 is
still uncertain, it is significant as the Court's first broad pronouncement on economic equality in the criminal process.23 The state of
Illinois had conditioned appeal upon the purchase of a trial transcript. Although this requirement applied equally to all defendants,
its practical effect was to deny the right of appellate review to those
too poor to purchase a transcript. The Court rejected the contention
that the state is never required to equalize economic disparities,24
holding that the state's failure to provide a free transcript to ·the
indigent violated the equal protection clause.25 In effect, the Court
considered the statute unreasonably discriminatory because it led to
one result for the wealthy and another for the poor, despite being
both fair on its face and indiscriminately admii;iistered.26
19. Id. at 373-74.
20. See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475 (1954); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
21. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The Griffin case precipitated a storm of controversy. See, e.g.,
LOCKHART, KAMISAR /1,c CHOPER, CAsES ON CONSTITUTIONAL I.Aw 706-07 (1964); Allen,
Griffin v. Illinois-Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 151 (1957); Goldberg,
Equality and Governmental Action, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 205 (1964); Qua, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 143 (1957); Tucker, The Supreme Court and the Indigent De:
fendant, 37 So. CAL. L. REv. 151 (1964); Willcox &: Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1957); Comment, 16 STAN.
L. REv. 394 (1964).
22, The principal opinion was written by Mr. Justice Black, and was joined by
Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Clark. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concurred, while Justices Burton, Minton, Reed and Harlan dissented.
23. See Goldberg, supra note 21, at 218.
24, 351 U.S. 12, 28 (1956) (Burton and Minton, JJ., dissenting). Although there is
no express language in the majority opiniqn that deals with this contention, the whole
tenor of Mr. Justice Black's and Mr. Justice Frankfurter's arguments inevitably leads
to this conclusion. See also Kamisar, Ras the Supreme Court Left the Attorney General
Behind?-The Bazelon-Katzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality and the Administration of Criminal Justice, 155 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 24, 1966.
25. The holding was given added importance by Mr. Justice Black's broad statement that "in criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race or color," 351 U.S. at 17, and that "there can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has," id. at 19.
26. The Griffin rationale was immediately utilized in several "indigent defendant"
cases which extended it to other aspects of appeal. See Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252
(1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963). It was
also extended to certain situations in which the indigent was without the assistance of
counsel on appeal. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The Court has even
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The Court's subsequent decision in Douglas v. California,27
which held that an indigent must not be denied the assistance of
counsel on appeal (at least on his first appeal as of right under
state law), effectively refutes a narrow interpretation of Griffin. 28
The view that Griffin considered only the availability of, or access
to, appellate review must be modified or abandoned in light of
Douglas, which made it clear that the evil in both cases-denial
on appeal of free counsel or a free transcript-was the same: discrimination against the indigent.29
Although the force of the Griffin-Douglas rationale was such
that one might expect it to be applied to imprisonment for nonpayment of fines, 30 such an extension was rejected by a federal district
court in United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross.31 The indigent
defendant, upon receiving a non-maximum, sentence of thirty days
and an additional sixty days for failure to pay a five hundred dollar
fine, sought release from custody upon a federal ·writ of habeas
corpus, contending that the imprisonment for nonpayment was attributable solely to his lack of funds, and therefore violated his right
to the equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment.
The court found no violation of the equal protection clause, stating
that since the prisoner's past criminal record and other relevant
factors allowed the judge wide discretion in sentencing, the prisoner
was not justified in comparing his situation with that of a wealthy
defendant who might avoid such imprisonment by prompt payment
of the fine. 32 This analysis would seem to skirt the issue by failing
to recognize that imprisonment for nonpayment of fines has always
been justified only as a coercive device, never as a punishment. 811
The judge's discretion as to the use of defendant's past criminal
record is relevant only when the sanction for the substantive crime
is being imposed. At that time the record may influence the decision
heard argument on whether an indigent state defendant has a constitutional right to
be furnished with the services of an independent psychiatrist, Bush v. Texas, 372 U.S.
586 (1963), but consideration of the constitutional issue was postponed when the state
agreed to a retrial.
27. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
28. See Kamisar &: Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota-Some Field Find•
ings and Legal Policy Observations, 48 MINN, L. REv. I, 12 (1963).
29. Ibid.
30. See Wildeblood v. United States, 284 F.2d 592, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Edgerton, J.,
dissenting). Judge Edgerton strongly objected to imprisonment for nonpayment as being
unfairly discriminatory against the poor. Since the defendant in Wildeblood was not
imprisoned for nonpayment, the majority found it unnecessary to pass on the issue
raised by the dissent. In avoiding the issue, however, the majority implicitly approved
earlier decisions upholding imprisonment for nonpayment. See also Goldberg, supra
note 21, at 221-22.
31. 239 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
32. Id. at 120.
33. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. See also Henderson v. United States,
189 A.2d 132 (D.C. Ct. App. 1963); Lee v. State, 103 Ga. App. 161, 118 S.E.2d 599 (1961).
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.
whether to impose a fine, imprisonment, or both. However, these

considerations have no applicability as a justification for imprisonment for nonpayment once the appropriate sanction is determined.
Thus, the Privitera court erred in placing imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine on a parity with incarceration for the substantive
offense.
The court in Privitera noted that the right pursued by the
defendant was in fact illusory, since on remand the judge, knowing
of the defendant's indigency, could avoid the equal protection problem by simply imposing a proportionately longer term of confine-·
ment as punishment for the crime, instead of imposing a fine and
then requiring imprisonment for nonpayment. 34 The judge's discretion in this setting is limited, however, by the maximum period
of imprisonment prescribed by the statute punishing the substantive
offense. The constitutional issue is therefore most directly presented
where the maximum term of imprisonment has already _been imposed, and the defendant is required to remain incarcerated for an
additional period because of his inability to pay the fine. 35
Precisely the problem just described was presented in People
v. Collins.36 Defendant Collins was convicted of third degree assault
and received the maximum sentence-one year in jail and a $250
fine. Since he was unable to pay the fine, he was further sentenced
to one day in jail for every dollar of the fine unpaid. The defendant
appealed, alleging that the additional imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum was unconstitutional as to him because he was
unable to pay any fine imposed. The court held that this additional
imprisonment discriminated between an indigent and a non-indigent, and therefore violated the equal protection clause.37 Relying
on a rationale similar to that of the Griffin decision, the court based
its holding on two grounds. The first was that the legislative purpose
underlying the statute imposing imprisonment for nonpayment-enforcing payment of the fine-was not being furthered when applied
to an indigent. It seems obvious that depriving the accused of his
liberty could not possibly have coerced payment of a fine he was incapable of paying, and would necessarily prevent the defendant from
earning money with which to pay the fine. Thus, the statute appears
to be justifiable only when applied to the defendant who has the
funds, but simply refuses to pay; othenvise the defendant is in effect
imprisoned for being poor. Second, the' court reasoned that the
34. United States ex rel. Privitera v. Kross, 239 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
35. This situation was expressly distinguished by the court in Privitera from the
facts before it. Id. at 121. There may be justification for retaining the "$10 or 10 days"
type of penalty, since abolition of this sanction would mean that the offender would go
unpunished.
'
36. 47 Misc. 2d 210, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970 (Orange County Ct. 1965).
37. Id. at 213, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
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wealthy defendant has an undue advantage in that he is able to limit
the duration of his confinement to the maximum period set by statute
for the substantive crime, while the indigent, given the same prison
term and fine, is incarcerated regardless of his desire to pay. In fact,
the indigent may find himself in the anomalous situation of being
imprisoned longer for nonpayment of the fine than the maximum
statutory period set for tlie substantive offense.88 In Collins, as in
Griffin, the consequence of the statute was discrimination between
rich and poor, even though it was equally administered and fair
on its face.
Although the court in Collins found imprisonment of the indigent defendant to be a denial of equal protection, it held that the
defendant was nevertheless accountable for the fine, and that the
state could take whatever action was otherwise available to collect
it.89 In this the court was clearly correct, since failure to take this
position would have enabled the indigent to avoid both the fine
and imprisonment for nonpayment, whereas the wealthy defendant
must always, upon conviction, suffer one or the other. The result
would have be~n the same discrimination against the wealthy that
the court found intolerable when directed against the poor.
An area closely analogous to imprisonment for nonpayment of
fines is the imposition of bail as a prerequisite to pretrial release.
In ea~h instance, the indigent is denied his freedom because he does
not have sufficient funds to pay for it. In concluding that no man
should be denied release because of his indigency, Mr. Justice
Douglas, sitting as a circuit judge, has advocated release despite nonpayment of bail when other factors indicate that the indigent will
comply with the court's orders.40 The law of bail, like that of imprisonment for nonpayment of fines', has been considered fertile soil
for the extension of the Griffin-Douglas rationale. 41 However, it
would be presumptuous to assume that this doctrine will easily accommodate the inequities in the areas of bail and imprisonment for
nonpayment of fines. When the criminal process is viewed in the
symmetry of its step-by-step gradations, it is apparent that the
Griffin-Douglas rationale was concerned specifically with the in38. This would have been the situation in Collins if the fine had exceeded $365,
Although the prisoner in Privitera did not receive the maximum sentence for the crime,
he spent twice as long in jail for nonpayment of the fine as for the substantive offense
(30 days for the crime and 60 days for nonpayment). See generally Davidson, Tiu:
Promiscuous Fine, 8 CRIM. L.Q. 74 (1965) (Canada); 123 J.P. 248 (1959) (London).
39. People v. Collins, 47 Misc. 2d 210, 213, 261 N.Y.S.2d 970, 974 (Orange County Ct.
1965).
40. Bandy v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 11 (1961).
41. Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565, 568 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (dictum). See also Foote,
The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 1125 (1965); Kennedy,
Judidal Administration-Fair and Equal Treatment to All Before the Law, 28 VITAL
SPEECHES 706 (1962); 113 U. PA. L. REv. 774 (1965).
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equities in the actual process of determining guilt or innocenc~-the
trial and appeal stage. On the other hand, the imposition of bail
occurs prior to the commencement of that stage, and the imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine occurs subsequent to the termination
of that stage. In either case, if the indigent is to invoke the aid of
Griffin and Douglas, he must bring about an extension of that doctrine to steps in the criminal process not at present encompassed
by it. Such an extension to the problem of imprisonment for nonpayment of fines, however, would seem to be justified in view of the
_fact that society's interest in the accused now often virtually dissolves
after conviction, along with the judicial system's emphasis on procedures for fairness and equality.42
Opponents of the Supreme Court decisions extending broad
rights to indigent defendants have argued that these decisions frequently place an undue financial burden upon the state.43 However,
such objections are untenable in cases involving imprisonment for
nonpayment of fines. In fact, the state may actually benefit financially
by ·not incarcerating those who are unable to pay. The 1960 report
of the New York State Commission of Correction estimated the daily
per capita cost of imprisonment to be between $3.60 and $7.93.44
Since in almost every state the fine is discharged after the period
of imprisonment for nonpayment, the state not only loses the revenue from the fine, but also incurs the burden of paying for the prisoner's incarceration. On the other hand, insistence on the eventual
payment of the fine, without incarceration for nonpayment, relieves
the state of the prisoner's upkeep, and allows for the possibility
of collecting the fine at some later date, a practical consideration
which reinforces the result reached in Collins.
In response to a decision like People v. Collins, the state legislature must formulate a statutory scheme which enables the indigent
to receive the equal treatment to which he is entitled. The most
obvious possibility would be to eliminate fines altogether, punishing only by imprisonment. Since a one hundred dollar fine is no
deterrent to a man with means, while it is a genuine burden upon
the indigent, abolition of the fine might theoretically· be an easy
method of achieving equality.45 As a practical matter, however, this
42. See Silving, Inconsistencies in Present Criminal Procedure, in EssA.vs ON
354-56 (1964).
43. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 509 (1963) (White, J., dissenting); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
, 44. STATE CoMM'N OF CORRECTION ANN. REP. 66-67 (New York 1960). A figure of
$4.56 has been submitted as the daily per capita cost of the Detroit House of Correction.
MICH. CORRECTIONS CoMM'N REP. (1961).
45. There has been considerable doubt expressed as to the effectiveness of fines as
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

a penal sanction. See generally Barrett, The Role of Fines in the Administration of
Criminal Justice in Massachusetts, 48 MAss. L.Q. 435 (1963); Davidson, supra note 38;
Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1013 (1953).
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is an untenable solution, for several reasons. First, fines have become
an important source of government revenue. 40 Second, there may be
instances where neither the offense committed nor the offender's past
record justifies imprisonment, but may warrant a fine. Third, the
exclusive use of incarceration as a punishment for crime would work
an inverse discrimination, since the imprisonment of an employed
man of means would nearly always impose a much more severe
burden upon him than that imposed upon an unemployed indigent
imprisoned for the same offense.
A much more feasible solution is to allow the indigent to pay
his fine in installments, through a job either with the state or in
private industry. 47 Under such a plan, a standard percentage of the
defendant's weekly or monthly income could be directly remitted
by his employer to the state.48 If the defendant "jumped" his fine,
he might then be imprisoned for failure to pay.40 Another solution
might be to give the indigent exactly what he was previously denied
-the right to elect between paying the fine and going to jail. If he
elected to pay the fine, the installment system of payment could
be invoked. On the other hand, if the indigent elected jail, as some
undoubtedly would, he would do so of his own free choice. However,
such an election might be rendered meaningless for the person who
is so poor and unemployable 'that it would not conceivably be possible for him to satisfy the obligation of periodic payments. To meet
this problem, the relevant statute might empower the court to assign
such a person to the custody of the appropriate welfare and social
authorities of the state. This custodial release would not only offer
the possibility of enabling the indigent ultimately to satisfy his
pecuniary obligation to the state, but would also offer significant
opportunities for rehabilitation. Another method which may successfully avoid the "equal protection" attack is the limitation in the
Arizona statute50 which forbids imprisonment in any case beyond
the maximum period prescribed for the crime. Although these suggestions do not exhaust th_e possible solutions, they are indicative
46. N.Y.C. MAGISTRATES' COURTS ANN. REP., op. cit. supra note 8; RUBIN, op. cit,
supra note 8, at 230; Note, 101 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1013, 1026 (1953).
47. Some states already have provisions allowing such installment payments. CAL.
PEN. CODE§ 1205; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § IA (1956); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 953
(1964): S.C. CoDE ANN. § 55-593 (1962); UTAH Com, ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953); Wis.
STAT. § 57.04 (Supp. 1965).
48. A similar provision is under consideration in relation to a state automobile
insurance fund. If the state is required to pay money out of the central fund, the
negligent driver who caused the accident would be allowed to reimburse the fund
through installment payments, measured by a percentage of weekly or monthly income.
Ann Arbor Conference on Auto Insurance, Sept. 15-16, 1965 (Remarks of Michigan
Secretary of State James Hare) (unpublished report in Michigan Law School Library).
-49. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:166-15 (1953).
50. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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of the type of reform that is necessary. Probably the greatest barrier
to effective legislative reform in this area is the idea that what is
accepted is what is right. Imprisonment for nonpayment has been
accepted for so many years that it is considered to be an integral
part of our system of criminal justice.
Besides exposing the inequities of imprisonment for nonpayment
of fines, the decision in People v. Collins potentially endangers the
constitutionality of every state statute permitting such confinement
in the case of the indigent. It is probable that the doctrine of the
case will be applied only in circumstances where the maximum
period of confinement for the substantive crime has been imposed;
nevertheless, its rationale indicates progress in the effort to make
equal justice a reality to all persons regardless of wealth.

.,

